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Organizational Conflicts of Interest:
A Growing Integrity Challenge
Daniel I. Gordon1

Conflicts of interest involving government officials have been very much in the news in
recent years.2 At least in the United States, public procurement professionals are
encountering more and more instances of a more particular kind of conflict,
organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs), which can be defined, initially, as situations
where an entity plays two or more roles that are, in some sense, at odds with one another.
This article endeavors to set out some points for consideration in this increasingly
important area. That we are seeing an increase in the frequency of OCIs can hardly be
doubted.3 As discussed below, alleged OCIs have been identified in various activities of
1

Mr. Gordon is Managing Associate General Counsel at the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO), where he heads the unit handling bid protests. The views in this article are Mr. Gordon’s, and
should not be read as those of GAO. The author thanks Jonathan L. Kang, a senior attorney in GAO’s bid
protest office, for his significant assistance in researching and editing the article. This article is a working
draft that is presented for purposes of discussion at the “Organizational Conflicts of Interest: New
Challenges” conference at The George Washington University Law School on February 8, 2005.
2
On just one recent day, September 24, 2004, The Washington Post had two articles discussing alleged
conflicts of interest involving U.S. Government officials--one involving the Secretary of the Air Force and
another involving scientists at the National Institutes of Health. See Renae Merle, Boeing Deal Faces
Justice Dept. Review; Potential Conflict of Interest Cited, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2004, at A4; Rick Weiss,
NIH Bans Collaboration With Outside Companies; Policy Comes After Conflict-of-Interest Inquiry, WASH.
POST, Sept. 24, 2004, at A23. The “revolving door” phenomenon (referring to individuals moving between
the public and private sectors) has led to complaints about conflicts of interest. The most noteworthy
recent case in the federal context may be the situation where a senior Air Force procurement official,
Darleen Druyun, is said to have had employment discussions with Boeing while she was still at the Air
Force and while she was involved in negotiations with Boeing about the award of a large contract to that
company. Watchdog Group Targets Contractors’ Hiring, Campaign Contributions, 18 No. 7 ANDREWS
GOV’T CONT. LITIG. REP. 13 (Aug. 2, 2004) (citing a report by the Project on Government Oversight
watchdog group calling Druyun “a poster child for the ills of the revolving door”). For an example of the
attention given to conflicts of interest involving government officials in the European context, see Tobias
Buck, EU’s New Competition Chief in Conflicts Fears, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2004, at 1 (citing an alleged
conflict of interest involving the person slated to be the European Union’s competition commissioner).
Conflicts of interest arise in many different contexts, far beyond the narrow scope of this article. For an
example of conflicts of interest outside the world of government, see Alec Klein, When Interests Collide:
Credit Raters Subject to Client Pressure, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2004, at A9 (rating companies may be in
situation where their interest in obtaining fees for conducting ratings conflicts with the need for
objectivity).
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For historical background on the rise of OCIs and early efforts to address them, see Daniel Guttman,
Organizational Conflict of Interest and the Growth of Big Government, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297
(1977-78) (emphasizing that initial restrictions on OCIs were designed to protect competitors, not the
public interest); Organizational Conflicts of Interest in Government Contracting, 1991 A.B.A. SEC. PUB.
CONT., at 4-11. See also, Charles D. Woodruff, Organizational Conflicts of Interest--Not What It’s Been
Said To Be, 16 PUB. CONT. L.J. 213 (Aug. 1986); James W. Taylor and B. Alan Dickson, Organizational
Conflicts of Interest Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 15 PUB. CONT. L.J. 107, 107-110 (Aug.
1984); James W. Taylor, Organizational Conflicts of Interest in Department of Defense Contracting, 14
PUB. CONT. L.J. 158, 162-165 (Oct. 1983). For analysis of OCIs in both a historical context and the context
of the current debate over “competitive sourcing,” see Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract:
Constitutional Visions: Time for Reflection and Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321 (Winter 2004).

the U.S. federal procurement process, from contracts for security services in Iraq to
public/private competitions for work to be performed in the U.S. This article first
suggests reasons for the increasing frequency of OCIs, then steps back to analyze the
elements of conflicts of interest and of OCIs, and then addresses the legal framework and
caselaw related to OCIs in the U.S. federal procurement system.4
Possible Reasons for the Increasing Frequency of OCIs
A number of reasons can be offered as possible explanations for the apparently increasing
number of OCIs in federal procurements. First, the consolidation within the industries
serving the U.S. Government, particularly in the information technology and defense
industries, has caused OCIs to be a more common problem.5 This goes beyond having
fewer contractors who produce a particular good or service; the contractors that remain
are producing a wider range of goods and services than they did previously, and it is this
change that is increasing the risk of OCIs.6
Second, the Government is obtaining more and more services from contractors, and those
services are increasingly likely to entail the exercise of judgment: rather than merely
obtaining computer-repair services from private firms, for example, the Government is
entering into contracts that include the firms giving the Government advice on which
hardware or software to buy.7 With fewer firms playing an increasing number of roles,
and those roles increasingly involving the exercise of judgment, there is a greater chance
that a firm will “trip over itself,” so to speak. If Firm ABC is a vendor of computer
software and Firm DEF is a vendor of advice on which computer software to buy, they
may both be able to sell to the government without risk of a conflict of interest; if,
however, Firm ABC buys Firm DEF, the DEF segment of the combined entity will have
a conflict of interest when it recommends that the government buy ABC’s software rather
than that of a competitor.
Third, the use of contract vehicles that invite “marketing” by the contractor risks
fostering OCIs. More and more frequently, the federal government is awarding
“umbrella” contracts (technically, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts), often
to multiple companies and covering multiple federal agencies.8 Those contracts typically
provide only a very low guaranteed minimum dollar value, so that the amount of revenue
4

This article discusses OCIs primarily as litigated in bid protests within the federal procurement system.
However, this focus should not be taken as an exhaustive review of every possible scenario in which OCIs
may arise within other areas of the federal procurement system.
5
See Thomas J. Madden, John J. Pavlick, Jr., and James F. Worrall, Organizational Conflicts of
Interest/Edition III, 94-08 BRIEFING PAPERS 1 (July 1994).
6
See Jonathan Karp and Andy Pasztor, Can Defense Contractors Police Their Rivals Without Conflicts?,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2004, at A1 (referring to defense industry mergers narrowing the Pentagon’s options
and expanding the product lines of the major suppliers).
7
See id. (referring to the military’s increasing reliance on large contractors to act as its agent in developing
and supervising weapons programs, and the challenges that large contractors’ dual roles create).
8
See Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) subpart 16.5 (indefinite-delivery contracts), subpart 8.4
(federal supply schedules). The “umbrella” contracts are also referred to as “master” contracts, and
correspond, at least in some respects, to the “framework agreements” used in the European Union. See EU
Directive 2004/18/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 114, Art. 54 (Apr. 30, 2004).
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coming in to the contractor may depend on the success of its marketing to federal
agencies. In that situation, the contractor has a strong incentive to persuade government
buying officials that the goods or services they need are within the scope of the umbrella
contract (which makes purchasing them without further competition quite easy). One
example of this arose in connection with an umbrella contract held by CACI, Inc., and
facilitated by the Department of Interior (under the General Services Administration’s
Federal Supply Schedule program) for information technology professional services. The
recent Army investigation of the treatment of prisoners by the U.S. military at the Abu
Ghraib detention facility in Iraq (the Fay Report) found that a CACI employee
participated in writing the statement of work for the delivery order covering interrogation
services.9 When a company expresses a view on whether its umbrella contract includes
within its scope the goods or services that a buyer wants, that company may be viewed as
having a conflict of interest.
The growing use of umbrella contracts has arguably given rise to another, somewhat
novel, kind of OCI. Agency employees who are making the decision about whether
particular goods or services are within the scope of a particular umbrella contract may
face something of an OCI of their own. In at least some agencies, the agency receives a
percentage of the revenue spent under the contracts they administer, and the desire to
enhance the agency’s revenue stream can create what looks like an OCI, which could
affect the agency’s objectivity in making determinations about the scope of the contract.
Again, the contract under which delivery orders for interrogators at Abu Ghraib was
issued could be raised as an example--the Fay Report points out that the umbrella
contract was awarded by a “fee for service” activity of the Department of Interior.
Agencies’ receipt of these commissions or fees (sometimes called “industrial funding
fees”) can, at least arguably, be said to create OCIs for government agencies.
Elements of a Conflict of Interest
OCIs are a subset of conflicts of interest, and, in analyzing them, it is therefore
worthwhile to see them in the context of conflicts of interest generally. Some definitions
of conflicts of interest refer to them as a situation where a person is torn between duties
(or loyalty) to two or more different parties.10 Thus, where an attorney represents
multiple defendants in a criminal case, the attorney may face a conflict of interest.11 The
term “conflict of interest” is well suited to these cases, since they arise when someone
9

Major General George R. Fay, Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military
Intelligence Brigade, at 49, available at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/reports/ar15-6/AR15-6.pdf. For an
example of this matter in the press, see CACI reports strong growth, FED. COMPUTER WK, Aug. 30, 2004,
at 63. For an example of some key related legal and procurement issues, see Steven L. Schooner, Iraq
Contracting: Predictable Lessons Learned, Statement before the U.S. Senate Democratic Policy
Committee (Sept. 10, 2004), available at http://www.law.gwu.edu/facweb/sschooner/Sen-Iraq04.pdf.
10
For example, the online Real Life Dictionary of the Law by Gerald and Kathleen Hill, defines a conflict
of interest as “a situation in which a person has a duty to more than one person or organization, but cannot
do justice to the actual or potentially adverse interests of both parties.” See Law.com Dictionary, available
at http://dictionary.law.com.
11
See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (discussing conflicts of interest in representing multiple
criminal defendants, including cases cited on the subject).
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finds him- or herself trying to serve (or to be loyal to) two or more people (or
organizations) whose interests conflict with one another. The conflicted person is trying
to serve two masters who are pulling in different directions.
At least in federal procurement cases, however, conflicts of interest rarely involve a
person trying to serve two masters. An illustration, which, while not a procurement case,
may in fact be more typical of conflicts of interest as they arise in procurement cases than
the “two masters” model: we might well say that Judge Mary Smith has a conflict of
interest in the case of ABC vs. DEF if Judge Smith owns stock in ABC and she is asked
to be the presiding judge in the lawsuit--but not because Judge Smith is serving two
masters, or serving two conflicting interests outside of herself. The three elements of this
conflict of interest are: (1) the conflicted party12--here, Judge Smith; (2) an interest that
the conflicted party has in the situation--here, Judge Smith’s presumed interest in the
value of her stock being preserved; and (3) a responsibility that the conflicted party has to
a third party--here, Judge Smith’s duty to the judicial system to judge the ABC vs. DEF
case impartially. Each of the three elements merits further discussion, with the emphasis
on how they present themselves in the context of OCIs.
The conflicted party. In a personal conflict of interest, the conflicted party will be a
person. In an OCI, the conflicted party will, not surprisingly, be an organization. That
difference has at least one key assumption built into it, and some significant implications.
The assumption is that all the people and bodies associated with an organization--whether
they are agents, officers, employees, officials, or representatives--will treat the
organization’s interests as, in some sense, their own and want to further them.13 That is
why we would see a potential conflict of interest in a situation where, if individuals in a
firm’s research and development office help a government agency draft the specifications
for a new weapon system, management in a different office of the same firm wants to
compete to build the system for the government. Not only are all employees, agents, etc.
of the firm assumed to want to further the firm’s interests; this assumption may be
extended to all employees, agents, etc. of all affiliates of the firm (subsidiaries, parents,
and sister organizations).14
The conflicted party’s interest in the situation. This is always something that can be
readily identified as an “interest,” and it is usually a financial interest. That is, the party
typically has either money at stake or something else at stake that relates to money (for
example, property whose value is at risk, such as Judge Smith’s stock, or a job or a
promotion). And it is the conflicted party’s personal interest (for example, Judge Smith’s
interest in the value of her stock), not someone else’s. We tend to be “stingy” in
12

In much of the discussion that follows, there is a question about whether the party is actually facing a
conflict of interest, so that, strictly speaking, it would be more correct to write “allegedly conflicted party.”
If the word “allegedly” is omitted, it is only for brevity’s sake.
13
One could say that the organization’s employees, agents, etc., have an OCI because they are serving two
masters: the organization and some other entity. OCIs are not, however, generally viewed this way;
instead, it is said that the organization (not the employee) has an OCI. Indeed, that is presumably why we
call them organizational conflicts of interest.
14
See, e.g., ICF, Inc., B-241372, Feb. 6, 1991, 91-1 CPD ¶ 124 at 1 (finding an OCI created by relationship
between firm and its parent and sister corporations).
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accepting that any other individual’s interest will trigger a personal conflict of interest.
For example, we probably would not say that Judge Smith had a conflict of interest just
because her neighbor, or her cousin, or one of her friends held stock in ABC, Inc. We
might, though, feel she had a conflict of interest if her spouse or life partner held ABC
stock (which may explain why the U.S. Senate financial disclosure form requires the
person filling it out to identify a spouse’s assets).15 This narrow focus is in contrast to the
tendency to ascribe a desire to further an organization’s interest to all its employees, etc.,
and all of its affiliates and their employees, etc. As the cases discussed later in the article
illustrate, in OCIs, the interest is usually as readily identifiable, and as typically financial
as is the case with personal conflicts of interest.
The conflicted party’s responsibility to a third party. This is the competing “interest” in
the conflict. While the conflicted party (or his or her organization) typically has a
readily-identifiable interest at stake (and usually a financial one), this other side of the
conflict is often one that we might not see as the conflicted party’s interest at all.16 At
most, it could be said that some third party has an “interest” at stake, but that interest is
often non-financial and indeed in many cases (perhaps most), the third party is simply
trying to obtain an unbiased opinion about something from the conflicted party. To
return to our example, the “interest” that conflicts with Judge Smith’s interest in the value
of her ABC stock is the parties’ interest in the fair adjudication of their dispute
(presumably DEF is more worried about Judge Smith’s stock ownership than ABC is).
That is, we say that she has a conflict of interest because her personal stake in ABC stock
risks interfering with her ability to fulfill her duty to the judicial system (and the parties)
to judge the case fairly and objectively. In other words, the conflicted party’s personal-or, in the case of an OCI, the organizational--interest is at odds with the conflicted party’s
responsibility to a third party, and that responsibility typically entails the providing of fair
judgment untainted by personal interest.17
Legal Framework Governing OCIs in the Context of U.S. Federal Procurements
With this analytical framework in mind, let us turn to the legal definitions and categories
in the U.S. federal procurement context. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
defines an OCI as follows: “because of other activities or relationships with other
persons, a person is unable or potentially unable to render impartial assistance or advice
to the Government, or the person’s objectivity in performing the contract work is or
might be otherwise impaired, or a person has an unfair competitive advantage.”18 In
terms of the elements of a conflict of interest set out above, the conflicted party is the
15

See Senate Select Committee on Ethics website, available at http://ethics.senate.gov.
In defining personal conflicts of interest, one author has written of the clash between a public official’s
interest in performing his (or her) official duties and the official’s interest in his (or her) private affairs,
“especially his economic affairs.” Robert S. Pasley, Individual Conflicts of Interest, 64-4 BRIEFING PAPERS
7 (Aug. 1964).
17
See Robert S. Pasley, Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 64-6 BRIEFING PAPERS 97 (Dec. 1964)
(writing that an OCI may exist when a government contractor “finds itself motivated by two competing
interests . . . .”) The same author writes about “a clash, or the appearance of a clash,” of interests at issue in
individual conflicts of interest. Pasley, supra note 16.
18
FAR § 2.101.
16
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organization--referred to as “a person” in the FAR definition. Since this is a definition of
an OCI, not a personal conflict of interest, we have to presume that the FAR is using the
word “person” in the legal sense, which would include treating a company or other
organization as a “person.”19 The conflicted party’s interest in the situation is somewhat
camouflaged behind the words “because of other activities or relationships with other
persons.” The intent, apparently, is to refer to the organization’s financial interests that
are at stake in carrying out the organization’s responsibilities to a third party--“to render
impartial assistance or advice to the Government” and to provide “objectivity in
performing the contract work.” Both of the quoted phrases entail the risk of biased
judgment typical in conflicts of interest.20 Where, for example, a contractor’s employee
is asked to provide advice to the government, and the employee’s company stands to gain
or lose additional contracts, depending on what advice the employee provides to the
government, there is an OCI calling into question the employee’s ability to render
impartial advice.
What of the final phrase of the definition--“a person has an unfair competitive
advantage”? It is something of a challenge to fit it into the conflict framework. While
one could say that every company has an obligation to compete without unfair
advantages, calling this an OCI seems like a semantic stretch. Having an unfair
competitive advantage, notably, is not related to the biased judgment that is otherwise the
hallmark of a conflict of interest. Even in the situation where an unequal access to
information case sounds most like an OCI – where a firm has access to nonpublic
information due to its work under a prior contract and that information may help the firm
in competing for a future contract – the situation would be just as troubling if the firm
had never held a prior government contract, but had instead gained access to the
nonpublic information by, for example, receiving it through an inadvertent disclosure by
the government, or by hacking into the government’s computer files or bribing a
government official – or, for that matter, through industrial espionage. The problem in
those cases is that the competition is tainted, not that the taint arose due to a firm’s prior
contract. This is not to say that unfair competitive advantages are good--but it may be
confusing and inappropriate to say that they create an organizational (or any other kind
of) conflict of interest.21
Be that as it may, based largely on the language in FAR subpart 9.5, the caselaw has
divided OCIs into three groups, referred to as biased ground rules, unequal access to
19

See 15 No. 1 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 1 (Jan. 2001) (finding the use of the word “person” misleading and,
more generally, questioning the adequacy of the regulatory guidance).
20
Indeed, there may be no meaningful difference between the two phrases, other than that the first appears
to relate to situations where a firm has a contract to provide assistance or advice, while the second may
refer to contract work that does not, on its face, look like the provision of assistance or advice.
21
For example, FAR 9.505-2 recognizes that certain competitive advantages are inevitable, such as those
enjoyed by development contractors. A contractor who designs and developers certain items will often be
in the best position to provide that item because “[d]evelopment contractors can frequently start production
early and more knowledgeably than firms that did not participate in the development, and this can affect the
time and quality of production, both of which are important to the government.” FAR 9.505-2(a)(3). The
FAR therefore acknowledges this advantage, but concludes that “while the development contractor has a
competitive advantage, it is an unavoidable one that is not considered unfair; hence no [OCI] prohibitions
should be imposed.” Id.
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information, and impaired objectivity, and have treated each of those three groups
somewhat differently.22 “Biased ground rules” refers to situations where a company sets
the ground rules for a future competition by, for example, writing the specifications that
competitors for a contract must meet. “Unequal access to information” arises where a
company has access to nonpublic information (typically through performance of a
contract) that gives it an unfair advantage in the competition for a later contract.
“Impaired objectivity” comes into play when a company is asked to perform tasks that
require objectivity, but another role the company plays casts doubt on the company’s
ability to be truly objective (for example, where a company is to give the government an
assessment of the performance of firms, where one of those firms is an affiliate of the
company giving the assessment).23
Litigating OCIs in the Context of Federal Procurements
When litigation has arisen regarding OCIs in the context of federal procurement, the FAR
language is the governing law. The context of that litigation is bid protests--challenges
brought by bidders dissatisfied with a contracting agency’s conduct of a procurement.
Bid protests can be filed with the contracting agency, GAO, or the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims (COFC).24
The vast majority of bid protests are filed by a private firm concerned that a federal
agency has treated it improperly and thus given another private firm an unfair advantage
in the competition for a federal contract. A far smaller number of bid protests involve
competitions between private firms and public-sector employees, although a number of
significant conflict of interest decisions have arisen from those competitions. The
public/private competitions are conducted pursuant to a directive of the Office of
Management and Budget referred to as OMB Circular A-76, and the competitions are
sometimes referred to as “A-76 competitions.” In these competitions, federal employees
propose a “most efficient organization” (MEO), typically a slimmed-down version of the
22

The earliest GAO bid protest decision to use this terminology was Aetna Government Health Plans, Inc.;
Foundation Health Federal Services, Inc., B-254397 et al., July 27, 1995, 95-2 CPD ¶ 129. The COFC
cited the Aetna decision and its categorization of OCIs. See, e.g., Vantage Assocs., Inc. v. United States,
59 Fed. Cl. 1, 10 (2003).
23
Although the published decisions, following the FAR, tend to treat them separately, the “biased ground
rules” cases would appear to be simply a subset of the “impaired objectivity” cases: in all these situations,
the conflicted entity is the contractor; its interest is in obtaining more money from the government
(typically, but not always, through the award of future contracts); and its responsibility to a third party is
the contractor’s obligation to provided unbiased advice to the government. The “biased ground rules”
cases are those where the contractor is providing advice about the ground rules (typically by drafting
specifications) for a competition for a future contract. Obviously, if the contractor has an interest in
winning that competition, it has a conflict of interest that calls into doubt its ability to provided unbiased
advice about the appropriate specifications--in other words, it risks having impaired objectivity.
24
GAO decides protests under the authority of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984. 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-56 (2000). The COFC’s post-award bid protest jurisdiction is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4).
With a few exceptions, bid protests may be brought by bidders to challenge the procurement actions of any
U.S. federal agency. Other than the COFC’s bid protest decisions, there are only a limited number of court
decisions addressing OCIs. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.,
352 F.3d 908 (4th Cir. 2003); LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P. v. Abraham, 347 F.3d 315 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
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workforce currently performing the work, and that MEO is compared to the best offer
received from the private sector to see whether the work should be retained in-house or
contracted out.
Whether in the setting of public/private competitions or the more typical private/private
competitions for federal contracts, OCI allegations in bid protests take one of two forms:
a protester may allege either that an OCI has tainted the procurement process or that a
competitor should be excluded from the competition (in part or entirely) because that
firm’s performance of the contract would create an OCI.25 In either of these contexts
there is a dispute about whether an OCI exists (or may arise)--essentially, these cases turn
on whether the elements of an OCI are present (or, again, may arise). Separate from
these cases where the parties dispute the existence of an OCI are the protests where the
contracting agency recognized an actual or potential OCI, but the protester contends that
the agency’s steps to address it were legally inadequate, or, in the case of a party
excluded from competition, that the agency improperly determined that the protester has
an OCI that cannot be mitigated. We address each of those situations in turn.26
OCIs Tainting the Procurement Process
Where an award that has been made is alleged to have been tainted by an OCI, resolution
of a protest will usually turn on the alleged “taint.” A straightforward example is
presented by CDR Enterprises, Inc., where the protester alleged that the firm that won the
competition should have been rejected due to an OCI, created both by its alleged role in
drafting the solicitation’s statement of work and by its “direct oversight relationship”
during the process of selecting the winner of the competition.27 After developing the
protest record, GAO concluded that the allegedly conflicted firm had not played a
significant role in either the drafting of the statement of work or the selecting of the
winner of the competition. The result was that there was no conflict, and the protest was
therefore denied.28
25

FAR 9.502(c) may be capturing this distinction when it states: “An organizational conflict of interest
may result when factors create an actual or potential conflict of interest on an instant contract, or when the
nature of the work to be performed on the instant contract creates an actual or potential conflict of interest
on a future acquisition.”
26
We note that GAO generally conducts hearings in only a small minority of protests. With regard to
protests that involve OCIs, however, GAO appears to conduct a proportionately higher number of hearings
for those protests that result in a written decision. See, e.g., Science Applications Int’l Corp., B-293601.5,
Sept. 21, 2004, 2004 CPD ¶ 201; PURVIS Sys., Inc., B-293807.3, B-293807.4, Aug. 16, 2004, 2004 CPD
¶ 177; Science Applications Int’l Corp., B-293601, et al., May 3, 2004, 2004 CPD ¶ 96; Mechanical Equip.
Co., Inc.; Highland Eng’g, Inc.; Etnyre Int’l, Ltd.; Kara Aerospace, Inc., B-292789.2, et al., Dec. 15, 2003,
2004 CPD ¶ 192; LEADS Corp., B-292465, Sept. 26, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 197.
27
B-293557, Mar. 26, 2004, 2004 CPD ¶ 46.
28
Similarly, in American Artisan Productions, Inc., B-292559, B-292559.2, Oct. 7, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 176,
GAO held that the Department of the Interior reasonably concluded that the awardee’s use of a particular
subcontractor did not taint the procurement, because the subcontractor’s involvement in developing the
solicitation’s specifications had been limited. In Snell Enterprises, Inc., B-290113, B-290113.2, June 10,
2002, 2002 CPD ¶ 115, too, GAO denied the protest after finding that the protester had not provided
evidence that the awardee had assisted in the preparation of the solicitation of the protested contract, and
the agency denied that the awardee had had such a role. Similar reasoning led to protests being denied in
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A tainted procurement process has been alleged where someone playing a role in
selecting the winner of the competition is said to have had an institutional stake in the
outcome. The classic example in terms of GAO’s bid protest caselaw is probably the
Aetna case, cited above, where the OCI resulted from the work of a consultant who was
helping the agency evaluate proposals, including the proposal of the company –
ultimately the winner of the competition – with whom the consultant’s employer’s
affiliate was teamed as a subcontractor. The OCI tainted the source selection process,
and the OCI was “complete,” as it were, once the award was made.
The Aetna case is a good example of how sweeping the definition of the conflicted party
can be in an OCI: the connection between a consultant’s employer’s affiliate’s prime
contractor may seem quite tenuous (and certainly could not have supported a claim of a
personal conflict of interest), but that conflict nevertheless led GAO to sustain the protest.
GAO’s review of potential OCIs in these cases may turn on, first, whether the
participation that allegedly tainted the source selection involved the exercise of
discretion. This goes to the third element, the conflicted party’s responsibility to a third
party, with the government being the third party. If the contractor’s responsibility to the
government in Aetna had simply been photocopying, it is hard to see how that
responsibility conflicts with the consultant’s loyalty to his organization, so that
presumably no OCI could arise.29 Because any OCI has already arisen, these cases, when
they are litigated, may turn on whether any harm was actually done by the OCI.30
A number of protest decisions have been published addressing conflicts of interest that
allegedly tainted the procurements in A-76 public/private competitions. The alleged
conflicts have arisen where some of the federal employees evaluating the private-sector
proposals would appear to have had an interest in finding the private-sector proposal
unacceptable--to take the most extreme case, where the federal employees’ own jobs are
at risk in the competition. In DZS/Baker; Morrison Knudsen Corp., GAO found that 14
of the 16 federal employees who were assisting with the evaluation of private-sector
proposals held positions at risk of being contracted out and therefore had an unacceptable
conflict of interest.31 The conflict arises due to the tension between the employees’
desire to further the MEO’s interest (by winning the competition) and their duty to write
unbiased ground rules (if MEO members are involved in writing the “performance work

M&W Construction Corp., B-288649.2, Dec. 17, 2001, 2002 CPD ¶ 30, and in TRW, Inc., B-282162,
B-282162.2, June 9, 1999, 99-2 CPD ¶ 12.
29
Sometimes the second element in our OCI analysis is involved--whether the conflicted party has a stake
in the situation. For example, in Teledyne-Commodore, LLC, B-278405.6, B-278408.5, Mar. 8, 1999, 99-1
CPD ¶ 60, where GAO concluded there was no OCI because (among other reasons) the firm helping the
agency evaluators during the procurement did not stand to gain any financial benefit from its
recommendations.
30
The record sometimes allows GAO to conclude that, while there was an OCI, it simply did not matter (in
GAO’s terms, the protester was not prejudiced). See, e.g., IT Facility Servs.–Joint Venture, B-285841, Oct.
17, 2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 177 at 1, 4. The COFC similarly found that an OCI, if one existed, caused no
prejudice in JWK Int’l Corp. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 650, 655-59 (2002).
31
B-281224 et al., Jan. 12, 1999, 99-1 CPD ¶ 19.
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statement” governing the competition) and to judge private-sector proposals fairly (if
MEO members serve as evaluators).32
The A-76 cases highlight the contrast between the narrow definition of the conflicted
entity in personal conflicts of interest, as opposed to the expansive definition in OCIs. In
a competition involving only private firms, as demonstrated by the Aetna decision
discussed above, GAO has taken an expansive approach in defining the organization and
the “taint” that can lead to an OCI. By contrast, in the context of A-76 public/private
competitions, where a conflict of interests is alleged involving individuals working for
the government, GAO has carefully differentiated between, on the one hand, situations
where the individual actually has a personal stake in the outcome of the competition (for
example, by holding a position at risk) or his or her spouse has a stake in the outcome
(where GAO has found a conflict of interest), and situations, on the other hand, where the
person with the real stake in the outcome is merely a colleague, subordinate, or the like
(where GAO has found that no conflict existed).33 In taking this strict approach, GAO
could be said to treat the conflicts in the A-76 context more as personal conflicts, rather
than organizational ones.34
There is one additional and somewhat unusual context in which protesters have alleged
OCIs in A-76 competitions. Agencies, challenged by the perceived complexities of the
A-76 process, are hiring consulting firms to help them--to help the federal employees put
together their MEO staffing proposal, to help the agency put together the performance
work statement defining the scope of the services being competed, and to help the agency
evaluate the MEO plan and the private-sector proposals. As with in-house employees,
there is clearly a risk of an OCI when the same consultant helps the MEO and performs
32

See also Jones/Hill Joint Venture, B-286194.4 et al., Dec. 5, 2001, 2001 CPD ¶ 194 (finding that same
agency personnel participated in drafting both the performance work statement and the MEO’s
management plan).
33
A good example of the difference between the way colleagues and spouses are treated is the decision in
IT Facility Services. On the one hand, GAO found in IT Facility Services that no conflict of interest was
created merely because some evaluators had colleagues or subordinates whose job were at risk in the
public/private competition at issue. Similarly, in Federal Management Systems, Inc. v. United States, 61
Fed. Cl. 364, 368-71 (2004), the COFC found that the fact that evaluators interact with individuals who
hold positions in the function being competed, or direct some of their activities, does not create a conflict;
and in JWK International Corp. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 650, 655-59 (2002), the COFC rejected the
argument that individuals working in units that merely interrelate with, or rely on, those under study have a
conflict of interest. On the other hand, in IT Facility Services, GAO found that at least the potential of a
conflict was created where the job of the spouse of one of the evaluators was at risk (but GAO concluded
that the record demonstrated that that employee’s conflict had not tainted the selection decision because,
even if that evaluator’s scores were ignored, the outcome would be the same). In fact, it would seem that a
person’s ability to be objective could be tainted by friendship or a collegial relationship. For example,
where John needs to decide whether to send Mary or Bill to a week-long conference in Hawaii in January,
and John is a good friend of Mary but not of Bill, John may be unfair to Bill in the selection. Nonetheless,
people tend not to view that as a conflict of interest--not all bias is the result of a conflict of interest.
34
It should be noted that GAO has recognized that FAR subpart 9.5 is not directly applicable to A-76
competitions, so that it could be argued that GAO does not see those competitions as raising organizational,
rather than personal, conflict issues; instead, GAO referred to the FAR provisions as “address[ing]
analogous situations” and “instructive in that it establishes whether similar situations involving contracting
organizations would require avoidance, neutralization or mitigation.” DZS/Baker, 99-1 CPD ¶ 19 at 2,
citing Battelle Mem’l Inst.¸B-278673, Feb. 27, 1998, 98-1 CPD ¶ 107.
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the “above the fray” tasks of writing the performance work statement and evaluating
proposals.35
OCIs Associated with Future Performance
In contrast with the first type of OCI, where the competition for a contract has allegedly
been tainted by a conflict, in the second type, the competition process here is untainted by
an OCI, but performance of the contract will (allegedly) create a future OCI if a particular
firm is awarded the contract. For example, in Johnson Controls World Services, Inc.,
GAO found an OCI where a firm would be required to perform installation support
services, on the one hand, and then evaluate the efficiency of those services, on the
other.36 Similarly, in Ktech Corp., GAO found an OCI where a subcontractor would have
responsibility for testing Defense Threat Reduction Agency reentry bodies as well as for
monitoring the performance of those tests.37
These cases sometimes turn on the first element of a conflict of interest, the identity of
the conflicted party, notwithstanding the generally inclusive definition of conflicted
parties in OCIs. Specifically, the cases may turn on whether two entities are really part of
the same organization at all. For example, in American Management Systems, Inc., GAO
found that two firms, while they did have a marketing alliance, were not related in terms
of finances or performance obligations in such a way that gave rise to an OCI (even if
particular actions of one helped the other, that would not entail the self-interest that is
needed for there to be a conflict of interest).38
Where only one organization is involved, the cases may turn on the third element, the
nature of the conflicted entity’s responsibility to a third party. Where the responsibility
involves the exercise of judgment or discretion, GAO may well find that there is an OCI.
Where the responsibility is more ministerial or clerical, the relationship may not be found
to be an OCI.39
Failure to Address an OCI Adequately
FAR 9.504(a) requires agencies’ contracting officers to “(1) [i]dentify and evaluate
potential organizational conflicts of interest as early in the acquisition process as
possible; and (2) avoid, neutralize, or mitigate significant potential conflicts before
contract award.” While recognizing that contracting officers need to examine each
situation to address any OCI that is identified, the FAR provides some guidance,
35

See, e.g., Jones/Hill Joint Venture, 2001 CPD ¶ 194.
B-286714.2, Feb. 13, 2001, 2001 CPD ¶ 20. Presumably, a firm’s evaluating the performance of one of
its competitors’ systems would be just as problematic as the firm’s evaluating the performance of its own
system, although that scenario is rarely addressed in the case law. For a brief mention of it, see PURVIS
Systems, Inc. B-293807.3; B-293807.4, Aug. 16, 2004, 2004 CPD ¶ 177 at 11.
37
B-285330, B-285330.2, Aug. 17, 2000, 2002 CPD ¶ 77.
38
B-285645, Sept. 8, 2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 163.
39
See, e.g., Computers Universal, Inc., B-292794, Nov. 18, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 201 (concluding that
monitoring, such as quality assurance, standing alone, does not create potential for impaired objectivity and
thus OCI).
36
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including “general rules” that distinguish between “[p]reventing the existence of
conflicting roles that might bias a contractor’ judgment (what might be called pure OCI
situations) and “[p]reventing unfair competitive advantage” arising because a contractor
has access to proprietary or source-selection information.40 The FAR includes examples
of certain conflicts that cannot be mitigated--for example, where a firm receives a
contract to prepare a detailed plan for scientific and technical training of an agency's
personnel, and then suggests a curriculum that the agency endorses and incorporates in its
request for proposals to institutions to establish and conduct the training, the firm may
not be awarded a contract to conduct the training.41 The FAR also provides, however,
that the head of an agency (or a designee) may “waive any general rule or procedure of
this subpart by determining that its application in a particular situation would not be in
the Government’s interest.”42 The FAR sets out certain situations where an apparent OCI
situation is defined as not constituting an improper OCI, and where an agency has
reasonably found that one of those exceptions applies, a protest alleging an improper OCI
was denied.43
Where protests have been sustained on OCI grounds, it is usually because the agency
failed to identify an OCI, or, having recognized a potential OCI, failed to deal with it in a
legally adequate way. Thus, where the agency denies that an OCI exists, GAO and the
COFC appear to show little deference, if the reviewing forum concludes that an OCI
should have been identified. For example, in PURVIS Systems, Inc., the Navy (and the
allegedly conflicted party, Northrop Grumman Defense Mission Systems, Inc.) argued
that the contract services were purely “objective data measurements,” but GAO found
that the services would require “subjective contractor input and judgment,” so that the
agency had to address the possibility of a potential “impaired objectivity” OCI.44 In
Ktech Corporation, GAO sustained the protest after concluding that the agency had failed
to consider OCIs (both “unequal access to information” and “impaired objectivity”),
where GAO found evidence supporting both kinds of OCI.45 In one case, the COFC
ruled in favor of a protester alleging that a competitor should have been excluded due to
an OCI, because the court held that the contracting officer had failed to identify the OCI
“as early in the acquisition process as possible,” as required by FAR 9.504(a). The court
also rejected the contracting officer’s conclusion that no OCI existed; in the facts

40

FAR 9.505.
FAR 9.508(g).
42
FAR 9.503. GAO appears to review the reasonableness of an agency’s explanation supporting a waiver.
See Knights’ Piping, Inc.; World Wide Marine & Indus. Servs., B-280398.2, B-280398.3, Oct. 9, 1998,
98-2 CPD ¶ 91 at 5.
43
See, e.g., Vantage Assocs., Inc., 59 Fed. Cl. at 10-13 (2003) (holding that both the “developmental
contractor” and the “industry representative” exceptions apply, see FAR 9.505-1 and 9.505-2(a)(1)(ii), and
noting, at 12, the “deferential standard of review” on the OCI issue).
44
PURVIS Sys., Inc., 2004 CPD ¶ 177. In Mechanical Equipment Co., Inc. et al., B-292789.2 et al., Dec.
15, 2003, 2004 CPD ¶ 192, GAO found reasonable the Army’s conclusion that no significant OCI existed.
GAO also found reasonable the Air Force’s determination that no OCI existed in Wyle Labs., Inc.,
B-288892, B-288892.2, Dec. 19, 2001, 2002 CPD ¶ 12.
45
Ktech Corp., 2000 CPD ¶ 12. A somewhat unusual case is J&E Associates., Inc., B-278771, Mar. 12,
1998, 98-1 CPD ¶ 77, where GAO sustained a protest challenging the terms of a solicitation, because GAO
concluded that the solicitation was required to include a provision addressing potential OCIs.
41
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presented, the court found an actual OCI because the firm at issue occupied an
“impermissible dual role.”46
Neither the FAR nor the caselaw provides much specific guidance regarding appropriate
steps for mitigating an OCI that has been identified. While obviously any mitigation plan
needs to be tailored to the nature of the specific OCI, some points can be suggested. For
example, where in an “unequal access to information” OCI, sharing more information
with competing offerors may adequately mitigate the OCI.47 It would also seem feasible
to put a “firewall” around the individuals with access to the “extra” information to ensure
that they do not share the information with individuals who could use it to gain an unfair
competitive advantage. Where an “impaired objectivity” OCI is at issue, it is difficult to
see how a firewall within the conflicted organization would mitigate the OCI, in light of
the assumption in these OCIs that all employees of the organization will work to further
the organization’s interest. Placing a firewall between the organization and other
organizations may make sense, although it is not entirely clear what such a firewall
would entail. While the FAR does not provide guidance at this level of specificity, there
have been a number of decisions finding reasonable an agency’s reliance on a mitigation
plan under which a subcontractor would handle situations where the prime contractor
would be conflicted (or vice versa).48
More generally, where an agency has recognized the potential OCI and taken steps to
address it (in the FAR’s language, steps to “avoid, neutralize, or mitigate” it), both GAO
and the COFC appear inclined to deny any protest, absent some clear reason to find the
agency’s action inadequate.49 The best example of the distinction between what causes
an OCI protest to be sustained and what leads to its being denied may be the pair of
protests filed by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) at GAO. In
SAIC’s first protest, the firm challenged the conclusion of the contracting agency (the
Environmental Protection Agency) that no OCI could arise during performance by
Lockheed Martin Services, Inc. and that the agency therefore did not need to consider the
impact of an OCI in selecting the Lockheed Martin for award; GAO found, after
conducting a hearing, that the record demonstrated (and agency personnel conceded) that
the factual premise for an “impaired objectivity” OCI could arise. Because the agency
46

Filtration Dev.Co., LLC v. United States, 60 Fed, Cl. 371, 379 (2004). The court also found that the
protester was entitled to a presumption that it was prejudiced by the OCI. Id. at 379-80.
47
See Sierra Military Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 573, 583 (2003).
48
See, e.g., Deutsche Bank, B-289111, Dec. 12, 2001, 2001 CPD ¶ 210; Epoch Eng’g, Inc., B-276634,
July 7, 1997, 97-2 CPD ¶ 72; SC&A, Inc., B-270160, B-270160.2, Apr. 10, 1996, 96-1 CPD ¶ 197.
49
Thus, in LEADS Corp., GAO found that the Army had reasonably addressed the potential for OCIs
during performance. In Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., B-286714.3, Aug. 20, 2001, 2001 CPD
¶ 145, GAO denied a protest challenging the Army’s corrective action taken to address the OCIs identified
in a prior protest sustained by GAO. See Johnson Controls World Services, Inc.,B-286714.2, Feb. 13,
2001, 2001 CPD ¶ 20. In Knights’ Piping, Inc.; World Wide Marine & Industrial Services., B-280398.2,
B-280398.3, Oct. 9, 1998, 98-2 CPD ¶ 91, GAO found that the Navy had reasonably determined that
adequate safeguards were in place to address an OCI; in addition, the agency had properly executed a
waiver of OCI restrictions, as permitted under FAR 9.503. In Sierra Military Health Services, 58 Fed. Cl.
573, 583 (2003), the COFC denied a motion for a preliminary injunction, in part, because (so it appears
from a somewhat cryptic discussion) it found that the agency could later adequately address an “unequal
access to information” OCI by disclosure of information to other competitors.
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had not considered the impact of this prior to award, GAO sustained this first protest.50
After the agency then reviewed additional information and set up procedures to address
any conflict that might arise during performance, SAIC protested again, alleging that the
agency’s action was legally inadequate (largely because the agency continued to argue
that no OCI would arise). GAO found that the agency had adequately addressed the
potential OCI, and the protest was therefore denied.51
Where a contracting officer sees a potential OCI and excludes the firm at issue from a
competition, and that firm then protests its exclusion, both GAO and the COFC seem
reluctant to sustain the protest.52 In what would appear to be an unusual situation,
however, in one case the contracting officer recognized a potential OCI if the protesting
firm were to win the contract at issue and concluded that, notwithstanding the firm’s
proposed mitigation plan, the firm’s proposal should be excluded from further
consideration for award.53 The firm then protested to the COFC, which found that the
contracting officer had failed to meaningfully consider the firm’s mitigation plan and
acted unreasonably in concluding that the firm had “an unavoidable or unmitigable
OCI.”54
Apparent vs. Actual OCIs
The word “apparent” can cause mischief, or at least confusion, in the context of OCIs.
One hears reference to an “apparent OCI,” which sounds like a contrast to an “actual
OCI.” It may be more appropriate, however, to say that OCIs are always a matter of
appearance. For example, in the Aetna and DZS/Baker cases, the question was not
whether the consultant or evaluators provided biased assessments of the proposals they
were evaluating--the question was whether a reasonable person would find that their
objectivity could have been impaired by a conflict of interest, regardless of the
individuals’ integrity. In other words, the issue is not the reality of the individuals’
conduct and its fairness, but the reality of the conflict that the individual faced.
In any event, the “appearance” issue plays out differently in different contexts. Where an
award that has been made is alleged to have been tainted by an OCI, the OCI has already
arisen. Where the award process is untainted, but the firm awarded the contract will face
an OCI in performance, the OCI is prospective. In the former group, there is sometimes a
possibility of demonstrating that the award was untainted, as in the IT Facility Services

50

Science Applications Int’l Corp., 2004 CPD ¶ 96.
Science Applications Int’l Corp., 2004 CPD ¶ 201.
52
For example, in SSR Engineers, Inc., B-282244, June 18, 1999, 99-2 CPD ¶ 27, GAO concluded that the
Navy had reasonably excluded the protesting firm from competing in a procurement due to an OCI caused
by its role in preparing the statement of work and cost estimate; in Basile, Baumann, Prost & Associates,
Inc., B-274870, Jan. 10, 1997, 97-1 CPD ¶ 15, GAO found that the Army had reasonably excluded a firm
from competing under a solicitation because the firm had prepared the statement of work and cost estimate
used by the agency; and in DSD Labs., Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 467 (2000), the COFC found that
the contracting officer had acted reasonably in finding that an OCI precluded the protester from competing.
53
Informatics Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 508 (1998).
54
Id. at 518.
51
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case mentioned early. Obviously, where the conflict is prospective, there is no way to
prove that it will cause no harm.
Instead, for the prospective OCI cases (and occasionally in allegedly tainted award cases,
too), the case turns on the nature of the services to be provided in the future. That
question goes to what we have described as the third element of conflicts of interest.
Specifically, the question becomes whether the contractor will be asked to perform work
where judgment is needed. Obviously, if no judgment is needed, there is no risk of
biased judgment.55 Where the nature of the services to be provided is such that potential
bias could have an impact, an apparent conflict of interest may well need to be addressed.
Conclusion
OCIs are a significant part of the landscape of public procurement today. They present
challenges to the integrity of the procurement system, and they can create difficult
situations for contracting agencies, for firms that are potentially conflicted, and for their
competitors. The factors leading to OCIs are unlikely to disappear: the consolidation
within the industrial sectors selling to the government, mergers and acquisitions leading
to the presence of multifaceted corporations selling a wide range of goods and services to
the government, the reliance on umbrella contracts, and public/private competitions. At
least in the federal procurement system, OCIs look like a “growth area” for public
procurement practitioners, and one that bears watching.

55

For example, in Computers Universal, Inc., 2003 CPD ¶ 201, GAO found that the work to be performed
under the contested contract did not involve subjective evaluative judgment, no “impaired objectivity” OCI
could arise. Similarly, in TDS, Inc., B-292674, Nov. 12, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 204, GAO found that the
awardee would not have an “impaired objectivity” OCI notwithstanding the firm’s proposed
subcontractor’s other work for the agency, where the subcontractor would not be put in a position to
evaluate the prime contractor’s performance.
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